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ABSTRACT1 
 
The labor wage is the result of market variables and institutional settings of a country. In an 
open economy the determination of the market wage rate may be further affected by the 
extent of international mobility of both factors of production, labor and capital. Labor 
mobility is represented by migration in and out of a country, while capital mobility relates 
mostly to the extent of foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows and inflows. Migrants may 
represent an addition to the native labor force of a country and, in some cases, play a 
substitute role with respect to incumbent workers. FDI, in particular of the greenfield 
category, represents either a supplement to or a reduction of the domestic capital and, by and 
large, changes the opportunity set of  a firm’s CEO with respect to the corresponding 
company operating in a closed economy. International factor mobility and domestic market 
variables, such as unemployment and productivity, interact in the wage setting process.  In 
this paper, we derive a theoretical wage equation following the above premises, and perform 
pooled mean group estimates of its parameters on panel data for a group of 13 European 
countries with quarterly time observation over the period 1996-2007. We find that capital 
outflows  have a robust negative effect on the wage rate. The effects of migration inflows, 
on the other hand, are not so clear-cut, as they can be null or negative depending on the 
sample of countries considered. 2 
 
Keywords: migration, FDI, wage equation, bargaining. 
JEL classification: F2, J5, J6. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The problem 
 
The determination of the market labor wage in an open economy is affected by many 
variables. Some of them pertain to the very mechanics of the inner domestic markets and 
structure of a country. That is the case of unemployment, institutional settings, the diffusion 
and shape of the welfare state,  the dynamics of labor productivity, the extent of flexibility 
of the labor market. Other determinants are the aftermath of globalization of the economy 
and have an impact on salaries which depends by and large upon the intensity of 
international openness of an area in terms of both trade in goods and services and 
international mobility of production factors, i.e., labor and capital. While on the former set 
of variables we enjoy an abundant crop of theory and applied analyses, contributions on 
international factor mobility are more recent and display several controversial results, which 
leave wide room for research. Moreover, the majority of studies tends to be confined to the 
effect of international labor migration on wage levels in host countries and, to a lower 
extent, in sending areas. The investigation of the consequences of capital mobility on wages 
is less popular and is often neglected. Only in recent contributions international financial 
flows surface as a primary actor on the playground of labor markets equilibria. As a matter 
of fact the crossborder mobility of both factors of production is relevant and worth 
investigating in an age of growing delocalization of productive activities via foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and simultaneous migration flows of human beings. Indeed, the literature 
on migration mostly emphasizes labor immigration (entrance of foreign workers in a host 
country), while a lower attention has been paid to emigration (exodus of native workers 
from their own nation). In a general equilibrium of goods and factors international trade, 
labour mobility should produce compensating effects in the country of origin (wage 
increase) and of destination (wage decrease) and opposite movements in capital returns. 
However, the picture radically differs when market imperfections, different international 
mobility between capital and labour, large unemployment rates ( labour market 
disequilibria), barriers to trade of factors and goods  are taken into account. Turning to 
capital mobility, our attention is confined to FDI outflows from and inflows to a country. 
Other sorts of capital flows are thought to be non relevant as to their effects on wages. FDIs 
make (in particular greenfield FDIs, while brownfield FDIs are just acquisitions of existing 
companies by foreign buyers) either for an addition to existing domestic capital or for a 
potential subtraction from it. The FDI usually changes the opportunity set of firms’ CEOs 
since it allows an enterprise to choose between locations of production units in different 
countries. Therefore, before accepting a wage deal,  firms which have the opportunity to 
operate on a multinational scenario,  may consider the possibility of investing in a foreign 
country where wages may be lower. Of course this opportunity is not available for all firms 
in all countries. Multinationals, regardless of their size, may build new plants in foreign 
countries giving rise to an FDI either for the production of intermediate or final goods. In 
other words, the opportunities offered by international capital and production mobility, 
represented mostly by FDI, may make a firm less willing to accept a wage deal which could 
endanger its competitiveness vis à vis domestic and foreign rivals. The mirror image of this 
may be represented by workers willing to accept lower wage deals because of the dual threat 
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of fellow migrants who enter the country willing to work for less and of the opportunity for 
firms to locate production elsewhere. The moral is that capital mobility may affect in a 
crucial way labour market equilibria and provide additional downward wage pressure 
besides that exerted, if any, by the import of foreign labor via migration.  
 
 
Related literature 
 
In the last two decades, most of the rich and assorted literature3 on international factor 
mobility has been devoted to the investigation of the degree of substitutability between 
migrant and native labor. The focus has a political origin since trade unions and policy 
makers are quite keen about the wage and social effects of migration and their political 
consequences in terms of voting preferences. Policy makers oscillate between the Scilla of a 
thorough opening to migrants inflows pleasing entrepreneurs and the Cariddi of setting 
barriers limiting entrance of foreign workers to please trade unions. So do many papers 
moving between two different extremes, wondering whether migrants may represent an 
addition to the native labor force of a country or just play a substitute role. These two 
alternatives hide two different reactions of wages: no change in the first case, and a decrease 
in the second.  
The answers to this question are quite different, sometimes even in studies of the same 
scholars over time. For instance, if we confine to recent contributions, Ottaviano and Peri 
(2006) maintain that migration decreases the wage of low skilled while increases high skill 
wages. Later D’Amauri, Ottaviano and Peri (2008) explore the German labor market over 
the 1990’s and empirically adapt  a general equilibrium model. Migrants turn out not to be 
close substitutes for native workers but only for old migrants of similar education and skill. 
One year later, in an affine vein in a study on the U.S.:“If immigrants and natives in the 
same skill group are imperfect substitutes, the competitive effects of additional immigrant 
inflows are concentrated among immigrants themselves, lessening the impacts on natives” 
(Card, 2009, p. 2). In these contributions and in complementary researches (Ortega and Peri, 
2009)  immigration simply seems to increase employment and growth with no significant 
effect on natives’ wages. In some sense we may say that migration occurs in a quasi - 
Rybczynski4 framework, where the increase in the endowment of a factor of production for a 
country with no dominant position on international markets leaves relative prices of factors 
and goods unaffected and boosts aggregate economic activity5. The inflow of migrants does 
seem to reduce neither capital intensity6, nor total factor productivity in the short-run or in 
the long run, nor average wages and average income per person. Further evidence of 
imperfect substitution between migrants and natives is provided in a detailed coverage of the 
UK in Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012).  
                                                 
3Two comprehensive works deserve mentioning. The first considers migration effects in a historical 
perspective (Hatton and Williamson, 2005). The second provides a survey of recent literature focusing on wage 
and assimilation effects of migration (Kerr and Kerr, 2011). 
 
4After the theorem of  Rybczynski (1955) 
5To be precise, migration, in such framework increases the production of the labor intensive industry while 
decreasing it in the capital intensive sector. 
6In a Rybczynski framework the inflow of labor does not alter the capital intensity of each industry, but the 
production of the labor intensive good increases, thus reducing the aggregate capital intensity. 
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In most of these studies migration seems to exert its negative effect mainly on the wage  of 
incumbent immigrants while natives do not suffer in any discernable way. A distinct strand 
of literature claims nearly opposite results. In Borjas (2003) and in Aydemir and Borjas 
(2007) the pressure of migration on labor incomes is highly negative: “the wage impact of 
immigration depends on the elasticity of product demand, the rate at which the consumer 
base expands as immigrants enter the country, the elasticity of supply of capital, and the 
elasticity of substitution across inputs of production. The wage effect of immigration is 
negative if the impact of immigration on the potential size of the consumer base is smaller 
than its impact on the size of the workforce”(Borjas, 2009) which is what usually happens. 
In Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2011) the conclusion gets extreme: skilled immigrants and 
natives in the U.S. turn out to be perfect substitutes. Using Borjas (2009) dataset they obtain 
elasticities of substitution between natives and migrants which are much higher than those of 
Ottaviano and Peri (2006). In the same tune,  Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009)  had 
previously delved into the effects of migration from Eastern Europe to Britain since 2004, 
coming across an increased fear of unemployment and a significant downward pressure on 
salaries. Nonetheless, towards the end of the first decade of the new millennium more 
comprehensive and syncretic views appear. In Docquier, Özden and Peri (2010) emigration 
as well as immigration are explored in Europe over a long span of time. It appears that a 
drop in average wages is caused by emigration, while immigration has a positive influence 
on mean wages. This result is counterintuitive and is not consistent with non fixed price 
(non Rybczynski) factor trade theories where immigration should push down wages in host 
countries while emigration should have the opposite upshot in sending countries, as we 
mentioned in the first part of this introduction.   
As it can be seen, there are different, sometimes radically opposite, views about the overall 
influence of migrants on natives’ incomes. Nonetheless,  the indirect channel of influence 
through incumbent migrants seems to point to a definite substitutability between migrants 
and natives even after controlling for education and skill. Overall, the evidence is mixed, 
although there seems to be at least some agreement on the fact that migration touches on 
wages at least of incumbent foreign workers. 
Parallel to the investigation of market relationships between migrants and natives a second 
stream of contributions regards the issue of wage moderation in Western countries during 
the last two decades. According to many observers (Alesina, Ardagna and Galasso, 2008)  
the temperance could be associated to the degree of international opening of labor, capital 
and goods markets.  Quite flat wage dynamics have been observed in the euro area after the 
introduction of the common currency which imposed to all member countries a fixed 
exchange rate on almost half of their trade flows7. This wage moderation has been 
interpreted by Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno (2008) as a sign of a flattening of the Phillips 
curve. This appears in particular  in Spain over the years 1995–2006 when unemployment 
falls while wage inflation is low and constant as a result of immigration. A similar 
theoretical conclusion appears in Binyamini and Razin (2008), where, in a New-Keynesian 
framework, international labor, goods and capital mobility weakens the Phillips curve trade-
off.  
In the rare most comprehensive and general contributions the emphasis is not confined to 
labor but its is broadened to examine the international mobility of all factors, including 
                                                 
7
 On the rest of trade the exchange rate discipline has been even more severe because the euro appreciated 
since its specie circulation started in January 2002. 
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capital. However, a pessimistic outlook emerges in Jayadev (2007) where high capital 
mobility increases the bargaining strength of firms vis-à-vis workers, adding fresh rents to 
capital. This paper is an important step towards the understanding of  the influence of capital 
mobility on wages and is closer to our approach. On the same topic, a comprehensive 
theoretical paper had already warned, few years earlier, about the distributive implications 
of the international mobility of capital, which is obviously higher than that of labor (Zhao, 
1998). As a matter of fact FDI appears to reduce the negotiated wage since it shifts the threat 
point in negotiations between trade unions and firms. An opposite view may be found in the 
joint analysis of offshoring and immigration of labor in 58 U.S. manufacturing sectors by 
Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2010). Over the period 2000-2007, they observe a positive 
productivity influence of immigration and no net effect of offshoring. Notice that offshoring 
is fairly close to FDI outflows on which it is frequently based. A different story is narrated 
by Geishecker and Görg (2011) who maintain that service offshoring negatively affects the 
real wage of low and medium skilled individuals. High skill workers may benefit from 
service offshoring in terms of better real wages. Therefore, the overall result is a widening of 
the wage gap between expert and less expert workers. A similar story emerges from 
Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch and Xiang (2011) where offshoring tends to increase the 
highly specialized  wage and decrease the low skilled salary. The novel message of this 
contribution is that exporting increases the wages of all expertise types, while workers 
displaced from offshoring suffer greater earnings losses than other displaced fellows. Eckel 
and Egger (2012) maintain that multinational enterprises  use FDI to boost their threat 
option in bargaining over wages with trade unions, and exert a downward pressure on 
salaries. Trade unions could improve upon their standing by cooperating internationally. Yet 
this would be possible only if their preferences as to wages and employment converged 
across countries. Quite a remote scenario. 
 
The aim of the paper 
 
We would like to add our contribution to the above surveyed literature, by assessing the 
joint effect of migration and capital movements on aggregate wages. We shall assume that 
wages are determined in a representative bargaining framework where migration flows 
change the outside option of employed workers and FDI outflows shift and improve the 
outside option of firms. Entrepreneurs hold a kind of threat option to delocalize their 
productive units in a foreign country and to dismiss the domestically employed workers.  
The representative individual bargaining takes place between union delegates and the firm’s 
CEO. The outside option of the firm is given by the returns obtainable from delocalizing 
production abroad, mostly through FDI. Workers delegates during negotiation have to take 
into account the possibility of unemployment. In that case the most likely and immediate 
alternative salary employees may get is that offered by the informal sector, where the wage 
is highly affected by immigration flows. Indeed new migrants crowd this sector more than 
any other place. In this framework we jointly analyze the effects of migration inflows  and 
FDI outflows on the bargained wage. By adopting this approach we differentiate our 
contribution from existing literature and provide a novel assessment of the relationship 
between international factor mobility and wage determination. The empirical part of our 
analysis is conducted on quarterly data over the period 1996-2007 for a panel of 13 
European countries for which comparable data on migration and FDI outflows are 
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available8. Our main results point out that FDI outflows have a significant  and robust 
negative influence on the aggregate real wage. The effects  of migration inflows, on the 
other hand, are not so clear-cut, as the estimated coefficient is null  or negative depending on 
the set of countries considered. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we 
present the theoretical model of bargaining which will be the reference point for the 
derivation of the aggregate wage equation.  In section 3 we go through the estimation of the 
wage equation. In section 4 we draw the conclusions of our investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  The theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical approach we adopt is one of partial equilibrium based on an individual 
bargaining between workers’ and firms’ representatives.  
We begin by assuming that aggregate production (Y) is based on labor (L) and  raw materials 
(R), linked by a Cobb Douglas technical relation9: 
 
Y =  Lα R 1- α           (1) 
 
Labor consists of two components, native (LN) and immigrant (LM) workers, which, 
following Borjas (2003, 2009), we assume are perfect substitutes10 in production (L = LN + 
LM).   
 
The aggregate profit function, in real terms, is given by: 
 
Π = Y – w L– vR          (2) 
 
where w is the real wage and v is the (real) price of raw materials. 
We envisage a scenario where the real wage is not determined in a supply-demand 
framework but, due to market imperfections on both sides, via a bargaining procedure 
between workers’ and firms’ delegates. Specifically, we consider a Nash bargaining solution 
in which many identical firms and workers’ representatives  set real wages so as to 
maximize the following joint utility or bargaining function: 
 
Ω = [V  - V°]µ  [Π - Π °] 1- µ          (3)  
 
where  V and Π  are the unions’ and firms’ objectives respectively, while  V° and Π ° are the 
outside options that the two parties face if the bargaining falls apart.  
                                                 
8From Eurostat and OECD source.  
9We ignore capital for the sake of simplicity. Interpreted strictly, then, Y  should be final output net of capital 
compensation. 
10
 The rational for this assumption lies in the diffusion  in many countries especially in Europe of national 
contracts  whereby no discrimination  in terms of jobs and wages can be made between native and foreign 
workers. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the effects of migration feed back mostly in the informal 
sector wages. 
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We assume that the workers’ objective is simply given by the average real wage 
 
V = w                         (4) 
    
As for workers’ outside option, we assume that it is either the real wage that they can earn 
by getting employed in some other firm, w’, or the alternative income, w0, they may get in 
case they become unemployed and work irregularly in the informal sector (moonlighting). If 
the probability of becoming unemployed is a positive function ( f)  of the total 
unemployment rate, (u), then worker’s outside option can be expressed as: 
 
V0 = (1-f(u))w’ + f(u)w0         (5) 
 
Real income in case of unemployment, w0, is a fraction of the real wage which depends on 
the “moonlight” wage  that unemployed workers can earn  from off-the-book employment11.  
We assume that the“moonlight” wage is a negative function  of migration inflows, which in 
turn may be captured by the ratio between the unemployment rate of foreigners and the total 
unemployment rate. Since new migrants tend to be unemployed for a while when they 
arrive,  an immigration flow should be mirrored by a rise of the ratio between migrant and 
total  unemployment rates, and a drop of the moonlight wage. This assumption is consistent 
with the large portion of literature on immigration, seen in the introduction,  that endorses 
the perfect substitutability between new and  incumbent migrants.  
 
The expression for w0 is then: 
 

 =  

   
ℎ    < 0         (6) 
 
where uf  is the unemployment rate for migrants. 
 
The outside option for firms takes into account the possible transfer of production facilities 
in a lower wage country via FDI. As emphasized in the introduction a bunch of papers point 
out that this opportunity is going to affect wage bargaining in a way which is unfavorable to 
workers. For this reason we assume that: 
 
Π °=  g(FDI) with g’>0.         (7) 
 
In other words, firms are assumed to be able to obtain a return from relocating production 
abroad  in case the bargaining is not successful. Such a return is assumed to be a positive 
function of the amount of direct investment the firms carry out abroad. 
 
The joint maximization of Ω (eq. 3) with respect to w implies that the real wage must satisfy 
the following first order condition (FOC): 
 
 
                                                 
11
 We ignore unemployment benefits for the sake of simplicity. These could easily be introduced  (they are a 
constant fraction of the wage), without altering the analysis. See, for instance, Podrecca (2011). 
  DEAMS working paper 4/2012 
   
11 
 
 −  °
 =

 ( − )         (8) 
 
 
By maximizing Ω individual bargainers take w’ as given and behave as if the outcome of 
their bargaining had no effect on the wage paid elsewhere in the economy12.  However,  an 
affine bargaining is taking place between all firms and workers’ representatives in the 
economy. Therefore,  the real wage is eventually going to be the same across all bargaining 
units. 
On the basis of these arguments we may  maintain that  w’=w, so that:  
 
 −  = ()
 − ()
 = 
() 1 −   = 
() 1 −  

         .       (9) 
 
From equations (2) and (7) one gets: 
 
Π - Π ° =  Y – w L  – vR – g(FDI).                 (10) 
 
Substituting (9) and (10) into the first order condition (8) we get: 
 
 
!" #
 − 
 −
$ (%&')
 =

 
() (1 −  

 ),            (11) 
 
and finally: 

 = !" # −
$ (%&')
  (1 +

 () 1 −  

  )

,              (12) 
 
which suggests that, in equilibrium, the real wage is affected by four fundamental variables: 
value added per worker13 or labor productivity,  the total unemployment rate, the ratio 
between migrant and total unemployment rates and firms’ outside option to relocate abroad 
via FDI. 
A log-linearized version of (12) can be taken to be our “core” wage equation, valid as a 
long-run equilibrium relationship: 
 
log 
 =  / + / log 01  − /2log () − /3 log 

  − /4 log 
$ (%&')
      .                (12’) 
 
 
 
3. Estimation of the wage setting parameters 
 
The level wage equation (12’) is relevant when one thinks of long run (equilibrium) 
behavior. In what follows we will use an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach 
                                                 
12This sort of conjecture is similar to the one adopted in Lucas (1973). 
13
 Which is gross output minus the cost of raw materials  (in real terms), Y - v R. Since we are ignoring capital 
this should be, strictly speaking, value added net of capital compensation .  
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to model the short run dynamics of real wage adjustment, and we will estimate it and derive 
the associated long run parameters in a panel data framework.  
Given data on time periods t=1, 2, ..., T and countries i=1, 2, ..., N, we think of the short run 
dynamic specification of the wage equation as an ARDL(p, q,…, q) model, which can be 
reparametrized in  Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) form as: 
 
∆678
9: = ;9678
9,: + <9678=9,: + ∑ ?9@∆678
9,:@A@B + ∑ C9@ ∆678=9,:@ + D9 + E9:F@B     
                     (13) 
                         = 1. . H;    = 1. . J 
 
where xit is the 4x1 vector of the explanatory variables in the core wage equation (12’), bi 
and dij are 4x1 vectors of coefficients, Φi and cij are scalar coefficients and µi is a fixed 
effect14. Time trends and seasonal dummies could be included but we omit them in the text 
for notational convenience. We will however introduce them in the empirical estimates. 
The error terms, εit, are assumed to be identically distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance and independent across time and groups. 
Notice that equation (13) is identified if lagged levels of w do not enter the determination of 
the ∆x’s.15 Given (13),  the parameters of the long run level relation between log w and the 
log x’s (i.e., coefficients a1, a2, a3 and a4 in (12’) can be derived as: ai =[a1i, a2i, a3i, a4i] =  
−(bi/Φi)16. 
 
We will perform estimations on quarterly data over the period 1996_q1 − 2007_q4 for a 
group of 13 European countries.17 Data for the real wage, real value added per worker,  total 
and migrant  unemployment  rates are  from Eurostat source18; FDI data are from OECD 
source, and we use outward FDI as a share of GDP as a proxy for g(FDI)/L. The group size 
is limited by the availability of homogeneous data on  migrant employment and 
unemployment over a  time span  long enough to allow meaningful estimations.19 The panel 
includes 13 countries and, where possible, 48 quarterly observations per country. However, 
the panel is unbalanced since in 4 countries the time span is shortened due to missing data 
on migration variables in earlier years.20 
 
Before proceeding with the estimation, we check for unit roots  in each series, using the Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (2003) test for heterogeneous panels (IPS).  The results of the test are 
                                                 
14
 We model the real wage wt conditionally to the realizations of the explanatory variables in xt  and given past 
values of wt and xt. 
15This hypothesis in words means that past values of  the wage level do not affect current changes of the 
explanatory variables (i.e. of unemployment, productivity, migration flows, and FDI). Notice that the 
hypothesis does not exclude that lagged changes of w enter the determination of  ∆x’s. 
16
 The identifying condition for the short run wage equation (i.e. that past values of w do not enter the 
determination of the ∆x’s) also implies that there is only one conditional long run level relationship between wt 
and the conditioning variables. 
17
 The list of countries is: BE, DK, GE, GR, ES, FR, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE, UK, NO.  
18As a measure of the average wage, an index of average monthly earnings is used.  
19
 Many countries had to be excluded because data splitting total employment and unemployment between  
native and migrant workers are not available, or are available for  too short a time span to allow estimation  
(for Italy, for example, Eurostat data are available only starting in 2005) 
20
 Countries with missing data on migrations are:  NL (migration data start in 98), PT (migration data start in 
99), SE (migration data start in 97) and NO (migration data start in 2000) 
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shown in Table 1. As one can see  the unit root hypothesis is always accepted: there is clear 
evidence of non stationarity for all of the variables series.21 We then test for cointegration, 
using the Kao (1999)  and the Pedroni (1999, 2004)    Engel Granger based  panel 
cointegration tests.  As one can see in Table 2, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
rejected  both by the Kao test  and by the Pedroni’s Panel PP, Panel ADF, Group PP and 
Group ADF statistics.22 Having assessed cointegration, we now turn to the estimation of the 
short run dynamics of wage adjustment and the derivation of the associated long run parameters.  
 
To estimate the model on panel data, we apply the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator 
proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). Contrary to traditional pooling approaches like 
Dynamic Fixed Effects, the PMG estimator allows not only the intercepts (D9), but also the 
short run coefficients (bi and dij) and  the error variances in equation (13) to differ freely 
across groups, while constraining the long run coefficients to be the same across groups (ai = 
a). Since it does not impose homogeneity of short run slope coefficients, the PMG estimator 
also allows the lag structures in the dynamic specification to be different across countries. 
The estimator is efficient and consistent provided homogeneity of long run parameters holds 
(Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999)). 
We estimate the model including  time trends and quarterly dummies, and allowing the lag 
structure to differ across countries in the short run dynamic specification. In particular, the 
preferred (parsimonious) ARDL specification is selected for each country using the 
Schwartz information criterion. 
The results of the PMG estimates of the long run parameters are reported in Table 3, which 
also reports the Hausman tests for homogeneity of long run coefficients. These tests are 
applied to the differences between the PMG estimates  and the Mean Group estimates (i.e., 
the mean of the estimates of long run parameters obtained separately on time series data for 
each individual country)23. 
Let us focus first on column a), which reports the estimates for the whole group of 13 
countries. A glance to the Hausman tests (both for each individual parameter and the joint 
test) reveals that the hypothesis of homogeneity of long run coefficients is not rejected at 
high levels of significance. Looking at the coefficient estimates, notice that the coefficients 
of total unemployment,  productivity and the share of outward FDI on GDP are highly 
significant and their signs are in line with theoretical priors. Real productivity has a positive 
effect on the real wage with an estimated elasticity close to unity, as one expects. The total 
unemployment rate has a negative influence on the wage with an estimated elasticity of -
0.110, a  magnitude which is in line with previous results in the cross country literature24. 
                                                 
21We also performed  the CIPS test for panel unit root  proposed by Pesaran (2007), which controls for possible 
cross section dependence. The results (not reported, available from the authors upon request) , confirm the 
acceptance of the unit root hypothesis, and the presence of non stationarity for all of the series.  
22
 We tested many different specifications  besides those reported in table 2 (with and without trend and with 
different lag orders). The cointegration result is always supported. We also performed a cointegration test 
controlling for possible cross section dependence, based on Pesaran (2006) Common Correlated Effects 
estimates and on the CIPS test for panel unit root on the residuals of such estimates. In this case the unit root 
hypothesis on the residuals is rejected (thus confirming cointegration) only for a specification of  lags of 2 or 
less; the hypothesis is accepted for higher order lags specifications.   
23
 See Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) 
24
 Where the elasticity of the real wage to unemployment varies from around -10%  (e.g. in Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1990,1994) and Podrecca (2011))  to -5% (in Nunziata (2005)). 
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The share of outward FDI on GDP has a negative effect on the real wage, with a 1% 
increase in the share of outward FDI over GDP decreasing the log real wage by 0.026%.25  
As to the wage effect of the immigration flows  (as proxied by the ratio between migrant and 
total unemployment rates), although it has the expected negative sign, it is not significantly 
different from zero at conventional levels: migrations inflows do not seem to have any 
significant effect on the aggregate average real wage. 
The group specific diagnostic statistics for the short run equations of individual countries are 
reported in Table 4 panel (a), which also reports the country specific estimates of the 
autoregressive parameters.  The overall performance is satisfactory, given that  in the present 
context we are not able to take into account the particular features of each single country, 
and that our standard estimates cannot but sketch a first broad-brush picture.  A very high 
percentage of the change in the log real wage is explained in almost all countries26; the 
standard error of the regression varies from 0.3% to 6%27; at the 5% level of significance 
there is evidence of residual autocorrelation in one country28, of functional form 
misspecification in one29 and of non-normal errors in one30 while there is no evidence of 
heteroskedasticity in any of the countries.  
In column b) of Table 3, we drop from the sample the 4 countries for which observations on 
migration flows are missing in the earlier years31, and  repeat the estimates on a restricted 
balanced panel of 9 countries, with  the complete series of 48 time observations per country.  
In the restricted sample, the coefficients of unemployment, productivity and outward FDI 
remain highly significant and with the expected sign, and their estimated magnitude is quite 
stable with respect to the estimates of column a); on the other hand the result on the wage 
effects of migration inflows changes: the coefficient of the ratio between migrant and total 
unemployment rates is now negative and highly significant,  with an estimated elasticity of -
0.15.  
The hypothesis of long run coefficient homogeneity is accepted by the individual Hausman 
tests, and the diagnostic statistics in the bottom panel of table 4 are quite satisfactory, as 8 of 
the 9 country specific equations show no evident sign of misspecification. 
Although the ARDL specification used should mitigate the problem, the coefficient 
estimates in columns a) and b) of Table 3 could be affected by the potential endogeneity of  
outward FDI, immigration flows, and unemployment32.  Notice however that the causal 
effects from outward FDI to wages and viceversa work in opposite directions33, and the 
                                                 
25
 Since -0.026 = dlogw/dO_FDI, the reaction of the real wage to changes in O_FDI is:  dw/dO_FDI = -0.026 
w.  
Given the range of wage indexes in our sample, the reaction of wages to a doubling of O_FDI is in the range of 
2%-3%. 
26
 With the exception of Norway,  UK and Finland, where the adjusted R-squared drops to 27%, 44% and 3% 
respectively. 
27In Sweden and the UK respectively. 
28
 The UK.  
29
 Norway 
30
 Greece 
31The countries dropped are NL, PT, SE and NO. Missing observations on migration in the earlier years 
considerably lower the time span of the series for these countries, since in the estimation procedure 
observations on all explanatory variables are dropped in time periods with missing data for one of them . 
32
 As a matter of fact, productivity could be endogenous as well, if  one thinks of efficiency wage theories. 
33
 The causal effect from outward FDI to wages is negative, while the reverse causal effect from wages to 
outward FDI is positive, with higher wages triggering higher outward FDI. 
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same is true for immigration flows and for the total unemployment rate34. Therefore we 
expect that endogeneity bias, if present, would lower the magnitudes of the estimated effects 
of outward FDI, immigration flows and unemployment, i.e. would make them less 
negative.35   
Overall, the results strongly support our  model’s theoretical predictions on the negative 
effects of outward FDI on wages, and there is some evidence in favour of the predicted 
negative effect of migration inflows as well. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we tried to assess the joint effect of migration and capital movements on 
aggregate wages. We presented a theoretical model where wages are determined in a 
representative bargaining framework in which migration inflows and FDI outflows change 
the outside option of employed workers and firms respectively.  Specifically, workers have 
to consider the possibility of being unemployed and the fact that the alternative salary they 
may get in case of dismissal is the one available in the informal sector, where the wage is 
highly affected by immigration flows since new migrants crowd this sector more than any 
other section of the labor market. Migration inflows tend to lower the informal sector wage, 
and the lower value of the outside option for workers tends to translate in a lower bargained 
wage. The outside option for firms is given by the profits obtainable from delocalizing 
production abroad, mostly through FDI. FDI outflows shift and improve the outside option 
of firms mimicking a kind of threat of entrepreneurs to delocalize their productive units in a 
foreign country and dismissing the domestically employed workers. This in turn translates in 
a lower bargained wage. In this framework, we derived an aggregate wage equation where 
the level of the real wage is a function of  the unemployment rate, productivity, migration 
inflows and outward FDI’s.  The parameters of the wage equation were estimated on 
quarterly data for a group of 13 European countries over the period 1996-2007 by applying 
the Pooled Mean Group maximum likelihood estimator. 
The results strongly confirm the theoretical predictions on the effects of FDI outflows, 
which  have a significant and robust negative effect on the aggregate real wage. The 
influence   of migration inflows, on the other hand, are not so clear-cut: the estimated effect 
may be null  or negative depending on the set of countries considered. 
                                                 
34
 Both immigration flows and the total unemployment rate negatively affect wages, while the reverse causal 
effects from wages to immigration flows and from wages to unemployment are both positive.   
35
 The coefficient on productivity, on the other hand, would be biased upwards if endogeneity was present, 
since the causal effect of productivity on wages are both positive. 
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TABLE 1.  Panel Unit Root Tests 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series* IPS W statistic** P-value 
log (w) 3.0380 0.9988 
log (U) -0.03173 0.4873 
log(VA/L) 1.75244 0.9602 
log(UM/U) 0.42342 0.3360 
FDI/GDP -0.81932 0.2063 
   
 *w: real wage; U: unemployment rate; VA/L: real value added  per employed worker; UM :  
      unemployment rate of migrants. FDI/GDP : share of outward FDI on GDP.  
   **Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003).  
    Lag length selection based on SIC. Individual effects included. 13 cross sections. No trend  included.  
 
TABLE 2. Cointegration tests 
(i) Kao Residual Cointegration Test 
Series: log(w), log(U), log(VA/L), log(UM/U), FDI/GDP  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
     
     
   t-Statistic P-value 
ADF    4.869504  0.0000 
     
     Residual variance  0.010368  
HAC variance   0.002786  
     
     No deterministic trend included. Authomatic lag length selection based on SIC.  
 
(ii) Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test   
Series: log(w), log(U), log(VA/L), log(UM/U), FDI/GDP   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration   
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic P-value Statistic P-value. 
Panel v-Statistic  0.825612  0.2045  1.077848  0.1406 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.996315  0.9986  2.813071  0.9975 
Panel PP-Statistic -43.63414  0.0000 -52.69117  0.0000 
Panel ADF-Statistic -23.15424  0.0000 -11.13527  0.0000 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic P-value   
Group rho-Statistic  4.628643  1.0000   
Group PP-Statistic -46.75686  0.0000   
Group ADF-Statistic -2.997096  0.0014   
      
      No deterministic trend included.  Automatic lag length selection based on SIC  
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TABLE 3.  
 
Pooled Mean GroupMaximum Likelihood Estimates of the Long Run Coefficients 
and tests for homogeneity of long run parameters 
 
 (a) 13 countries* (b) 9 countries** 
  H test  H test 
log(U) 
 
-0.110 
(-8.66) 
0.00 
[0.96] 
-0.126 
(-5.70) 
1.28 
[0.26] 
log(VA/L) 
 
1.010    
(13.20) 
0.01 
[0.93] 
1.125 
(11.99) 
0.27 
[0.60] 
log(UM/U) 
 
-0.012 
(-0.73) 
0.20 
[0.65] 
-0.150 
(-5.53) 
0.01 
[0.93] 
O_FDI -0.026 
(-2.93) 
0.28 
[0.60] 
-0.038 
(-3.33) 
2.88 
[0.09] 
     
Joint H Test 0.72   [0.95] n.a. 
 
Dependent variable: log(w) 
w: real wage; U: unemployment rate; VA/L: real value added  per employed worker; UM :  
unemployment rate of migrants. O_FDI : share of outward FDI on GDP.  
t-ratios in parenthesis,  p values in square brackets. 
H test = Hausman test for homogeneous long run parameters, applied to difference between 
Mean Group (MG) and Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimates). 
*BE, DK, GE, GR, ES, FR, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE, UK, NO. 
**BE, DK, GE, GR, ES, FR, AT, FI, UK.  
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TABLE 4 
 
Group-specific diagnostic statistics and estimates of the group-specific autoregressive 
coefficient Φi 
(a) – 13 countries 
 SER AR(χ21) χ21-FF χ22-NOR χ22-HET Adj. R2 LL Φi 
BE 0.015 18.23 0.16 0.25 0.00 0.98 134.00 -1.0000 
DK 0.006 10.14 2.60 0.81 2.55 0.99 177.33 -0.0327 
GE 0.010 9.41 17.85 0.34 8.09 0.99 157.26 -0.0435 
GR 0.036 5.89 13.49 91.19 7.13 0.95 92.95 -0.1687 
ES 0.018 8.45 4.59 0.85 11.54 0.94 128.71 -0.0132 
FR 0.010 7.98 2.01 6.40 1.38 0.97 156.54 0.0003 
NL 0.018 10.83 5.69 1.01 1.22 0.99 92.46 -0.0382 
AT 0.011 2.72 3.47 4.61 0.01 1.00 153.62 -0.2507 
PT 0.029 25.57 0.00 2.09 0.17 0.96 77.73 -1.0000 
FI 0.014 3.76 1.53 1.25 0.27 0.03 139.05 -0.0104 
SE 0.003 2.20 3.08 2.99 2.12 0.87 184.21 -0.0204 
UK 0.060 173.34 1.02 1.39 0.99 0.27 71.09 -1.0000 
NO 0.007 2.58 29.26 0.79 1.40 0.44 68.94 -0.4904 
SER: Standard Error of the regression. AR(χ21): LM test for first and second order 
autocorrelation of residuals.   χ21-FF: Reset test for functional form.  χ22-NOR: test for 
normality of residuals. χ22-HET: test for heteroskedasticity.  Adj. R2: adjusted R2. LL: log 
likelihood. 
 
(b) – 9 countries 
 SER AR(χ21) χ21-FF χ22-NOR χ22-HET Adj. R2 LL Φi 
BE 0.017 28.47 0.53 0.66 2.80 0.97 127.83 -1.0000 
DK 0.006 9.04 2.68 0.83 2.54 0.99 177.03 -0.0222 
GE 0.009 6.48 5.79 0.26 7.20 0.99 158.01 -0.0699 
GR 0.035 4.39 0.86 80.19 5.24 0.95 94.84 -0.3316 
ES 0.018 8.38 4.88 0.88 12.44 0.94 128.97 -0.0193 
FR 0.010 6.64 2.51 10.46 0.85 0.97 156.79 -0.0190 
AT 0.011 3.27 0.53 3.02 1.07 1.00 153.48 -0.1515 
FI 0.014 4.03 0.05 0.72 0.09 0.04 139.38 0.0035 
UK 0.047 26.94 0.23 3.01 6.68 0.55 82.39 -1.0000 
SER: Standard Error of the regression. AR(χ21): LM test for first and second order 
autocorrelation of residuals.   χ21-FF: Reset test for functional form.  χ22-NOR: test for 
normality of residuals. χ22-HET: test for heteroskedasticity. Adj. R2: adjusted R2. LL: log 
likelihood. 
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